On the basis of a Salop model with regulated prices, we investigate quality provision behaviour of competing hospitals before and after a merger. For this, we use a controlled laboratory experiment where subjects decided on the level of treatment quality as head of a hospital. We find that the post-merger average quality is significantly lower than the average pre-merger quality. However, for merger insiders and outsiders, average quality choices are significantly higher than predicted for pure profit-maximising hospitals. This upward deviation is potentially driven by altruistic behaviour towards patients. Furthermore, we find that in the case where sufficient cost synergies are realised by the merged hospitals, there is a significant increase in average quality choices compared to the scenario without synergies. Finally, we find that our results do not change when comparing individual decisions to team decisions.
maximising.
2 When assuming semi-altruistic healthcare providers, Brekke, Siciliani, and Straume (2011) show that this relationship does not necessarily need to hold anymore. In a similar framework with semi-altruistic healthcare providers and quality competition, Brekke, Siciliani, and Straume (2016) demonstrate that for a hospital merger, the effect on the quality of care is not straightforward and, among other influences, crucially depends on the degree of provider altruism. The empirical evidence of hospital mergers on the quality of care is scarce and shows either ambiguous or little (negative) effects (see Ho & Hamilton, 2000, and Romano & Balan, 2011 , for two different hospital mergers in the United States; see Gaynor, Laudicella, & Propper, 2012 , for 112 hospital mergers initiated by regulators in the United Kingdom between 1997 and . Empirical evidence on the role of cost-related synergies due to hospital mergers is also limited, and the effects on the quality of care are not clear (Dranove & Lindrooth, 2003; Harrison, 2011; Lynk, 1995) . The existing evidence also lacks statements about the role of altruism and team decision processes that are common in hospitals (Barros & Olivella, 2011) , and might affect altruistic behaviour compared to individual decisions. 3 The aim of this study is to complement the existing field evidence and investigate the effect of a hospital merger in a competitive market on the quality of care in a controlled laboratory setting. We use a laboratory experiment, as we believe that the scarcity and inconclusiveness of the existing empirical evidence may originate from difficulties in attaining suitable data in the field. In particular, it is difficult to observe the role of altruism, changes in the cost structure, and the type of decision process, that is, individual or team decisions. Moreover, in contrast to field studies, laboratory experiments offer control and allow for implementing ceteris paribus conditions, for example, a systematic variation of market concentration, synergy effects, and the decision process. Finally, laboratory experiments allow for a simplified and perfect quality measure, as well as for considering the outcome for a whole market, and in particular to disentangle the reaction of the merged entity and the response of the independent competitor.
Although there are some experimental studies investigating mergers (e.g., Fonseca & Normann, 2008; Huck, Konrad, Müller, & Normann, 2007) or quality competition (e.g., Henze, Schuett, & Sluijs, 2015) , in a nonhealth context, they do not account for both quality competition and mergers, nor do they account for the particularities of hospital markets such as altruistic providers. There also are various health economic experiments investigating the role of altruism or professional norms for medical provision behaviour on an individual level (Brosig-Koch, Hehenkamp, & Kokot, 2016; Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, & Wiesen, 2016; Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, & Wiesen, 2017; Godager & Wiesen, 2013; Hennig-Schmidt, Selten, & Wiesen, 2011; Kesternich, Schumacher, & Winter, 2015) . Brosig-Koch, Hehenkamp, et al. (2016) investigate quantity competition between two physicians. Yet they do not investigate quality competition and mergers or team decisions, which might affect altruistic behaviour in a hospital setting.
We base our experimental design on a theoretical model on the basis of a standard Salop framework adjusted for the specificities of hospital markets. Quality provision of hospitals in the experiment depends on the degree of market concentration (pre-merger vs. post-merger), on whether the hospital is part of the merger (insider vs. outsider), and on the head of a hospital 0 s individual degree of altruism. Besides altruistic behaviour, we further aim at investigating factors that might affect quality provision behaviour, such as cost synergies and team decisions. In the experiment, subjects have the role of a head of a hospital and compete for patients by making quality decisions in a repeated game. Each market initially consists of three competing hospitals. Two of the three hospitals are exogenously merged halfway through the experiment. After this merger, one of the two heads of hospitals is randomly chosen to be the sole decision maker and to make quality decisions for both merged hospitals in the remaining rounds whereas one hospital remains independent. Quality decisions have implications for real patients outside the lab who could not be treated otherwise. To investigate potential drivers of mergers on the effect on the quality of care, we also implement treatment variations with either cost synergies or a team decision process. 2 The importance of altruism in the profession of healthcare providers has already been highlighted by Arrow (1963) . Ever since altruism has been a pivotal element in healthcare providers 0 objective functions, for both individuals like general practitioners and for agglomerations like hospitals (Chalkley & Malcomson, 1998; Choné & Ma, 2011; Eggleston, 2005; Ellis & McGuire, 1986; Heyes, 2005; Jack, 2005; Kaarboe & Siciliani, 2011) .
3 There is some empirical evidence on team decisions showing that teams make decisions more rationally than do individuals in the sense that teams are closer to the game theoretic predictions (Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998; Brosig-Koch et al., 2014; Charness & Jackson, 2007; Charness & Sutter, 2012; Cooper & Kagel, 2005; Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Kugler, Kausel, & Kocher, 2012) . Furthermore, the evidence on repeated team decisions in oligopoly games is ambiguous (Bornstein et al., 2008; Müller & Tan, 2013; Raab & Schipper, 2009 ).
We find that the post-merger average quality is significantly lower than the average pre-merger quality is. However, average quality choices are significantly higher than predicted for pure profit-maximising hospitals. The higher than pure profit-maximising average post-merger quality is potentially driven by altruistic behaviour towards patients. Furthermore, in line with our theoretical predictions, we find that sufficient cost synergies for the merged hospitals yield an increase in average quality choices compared to the scenario without synergies. Finally, our results show that quality provision behaviour does not change with a team decision process.
| THEORETICAL MODEL
The framework for the experimental design is based on a theoretical model, which allows us to derive testable hypotheses. We use a standard Salop model adjusted to the specificities of the hospital market similar to Brekke et al. (2016) . 4 In particular, we consider a Salop model with an exogenously fixed number of three hospitals, which compete in terms of treatment quality. In the following, we will briefly present our model framework and the main hypotheses as tested in our experimental design.
| Patients 0 demand for treatment
A unit mass of patients is uniformly distributed on a circle. Patients receive medical treatment in equidistantly located hospitals. A patient 0 s utility depends on the quality q i received in hospital i with i ϵ {1, 2, 3}, as well as on the travel distance between the hospital 0 s location x i and the patient 0 s location z. The disutility from travelling is measured by t > 0.
Patients are fully insured, that is, prices for treatment do not affect their utility. Furthermore, it is assumed that "basic" valuation of treatment v is sufficiently large to ensure that receiving treatment is always preferred to remaining untreated. 5 Given the hospital 0 s location x i and the patient 0 s location z, the patient 0 s utility u z;x i is given by
It can be shown that hospital i 0 s demand D i depends on the quality choices of all three hospitals active in the market and is given by
| Hospital provision behaviour
Hospitals compete for patients in terms of quality. 6 As prices p for treatment are exogenously given by a regulator and marginal costs c>0 per quality are constant, hospital i 0 s profit function can be written as
2.3 | Pre-merger scenario
In the pre-merger scenario, three competing hospitals simultaneously choose their quality in order to maximise their profit function as stated in Equation 3. The Nash equilibrium qualities are derived by the first order conditions (FOCs), and the corresponding quality q Ã i and profit level π
2.4 | Post-merger scenario
In the post-merger scenario, we model an exogenous market consolidation by a merger of two of the three hospitals.
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Following Brekke et al. (2016) , the merger does not result in a hospital closure but implies combined profit-maximising efforts by the merged hospitals. 9 The merged hospitals, hereinafter referred to as insiders, are denoted with the index I, and the standalone hospital (hereinafter referred to as the outsider) is denoted by the index O.
In comparison to the pre-merger demands as given in Equation 2, the market consolidation results in asymmetric demands for the insiders and the outsiders
and corresponding profit functions
Maximising the respective profit functions with respect to the insider and outsider 0 s quality leads to the FOCs, and
the Nash equilibrium quality is given by
Comparing post-merger and pre-merger qualities without synergies, we find that both insiders and outsiders decrease quality compared to their pre-merger levels. Moreover, the decrease is stronger for the insiders than for the outsiders. Hypothesis 1. Merger qualities without synergies: In an asymmetric post-merger scenario where two out of three hospitals join their profit-maximising efforts, (a) all three hospitals lower their qualities in the Nash equilibrium compared to the pre-merger scenario, and (b) insiders decrease quality levels more than outsiders do.
The Nash equilibrium qualities result in insiders 0 and outsiders 0 profit levels of
Without synergies, both insiders and outsiders benefit from the higher markets concentration, but the increase is stronger for the outsiders.
Hypothesis 2. Merger profits without synergies: In an asymmetric post-merger scenario where two out of three hospitals join their profit-maximising efforts, (a) all three increase profits compared to the pre-merger scenario, and (b) outsiders are able to increase profits more.
In principle, the marginal costs c I of an insider may differ from the outsider 0 s marginal cost c O due to cost synergies realised by the merger. In this case, we assume c I < c O = c for marginal costs; that is, merged hospitals can realise exogenously given cost synergies. The insider 0 s and outsider 0 s profit functions are then given by
and FOCs yield the Nash equilibrium quality levels of
8 Different to many other markets, consolidation in hospital markets often implies integration into consolidated hospital systems where the merged entities continue operating under joined ownership instead of divestiture of the acquired hospitals.
9 Note that theoretically, the active insider can do some quality discrimination post-merger. To keep the experiment as simple as possible for participants, we abstract from this possibility in the experimental design and thus neglect it in the theoretical framework.
with q
O for all cost synergy levels, that is, c I < c O . For sufficiently high cost synergies, that is, c I < (9 p c O )/(9 p + c O t), the Nash equilibrium quality of the insider is higher compared to the outsider 0 s quality.
Hypothesis 3. Merger with synergies: In an asymmetric post-merger scenario where two of three hospitals join their profit-maximising efforts and realise cost synergies, all three hospitals provide higher quality than in the case without cost synergies.
| Altruistic hospitals
Our theoretical model assumes pure profit-maximising hospitals. However, when assuming semi-altruistic hospitals similar to Straume (2014, 2016) , a hospital i 0 s objection function can be written as
where B i is the total utility of the patients being treated by hospital i and α > 0 is a measure for hospital i 0 s degree of altruism.
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Thus, to some extent, hospitals take patient utility directly into account when deciding on quality. This extent is more pronounced the higher is α. In the pre-merger, the Nash equilibrium quality q Ã iα and profit level π Ã iα of hospital i are then given by
If altruism levels do not offset marginal costs (i.e., c > α), quality levels are higher (i.e., q
Þ and profits are lower compared to the scenario of pure profit-maximising hospitals (i.e., π Ã iα <π Ã i Þ. Thus, our theoretical baseline result is that higher degrees of altruism tend to increase quality levels and decrease profits.
Hypothesis 4. Altruism: Altruistic hospitals provide higher quality levels and realise lower profits than do pure profit-maximising hospitals.
| Monopoly
We use the monopoly scenario as a robustness check for our experimental analysis. The monopolist 0 s demand is equal to one because we ensure a fully covered market. In this case, the profit function of the monopolist simplifies to
The FOC with respect to the monopolist 0 s quality is negative π ′ M ¼ − c<0, and the hospital will provide the lowest quality possible (q M = 0).
| EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our experimental design is based on the theoretical model presented in the previous section. In all of the treatment conditions, subjects have the role of a head of a hospital. As in other comparable market experiments (Fonseca & Normann, 2008; Huck et al., 2007) , we use a student subject pool.
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Subjects having the role of a head of a hospital participate in two consecutive parts. In Part 1, three independent hospitals compete for patients on a Salop circle.
12 In Part 2, subjects then either remain in the same competitive scenarioCompetition-or experience a market intervention in the form of a merger of two randomly determined hospitals. 13 For 10 For the patients 0 utility function and the patient utility tables presented in the experiment, see Appendix S1.
11 Although heads of hospitals are typically managers or physicians, previous experimental evidence shows that using a student subject pool does not substantially affect behaviour. For a subject pool comparison of managers and students, see Bolton, Ockenfels, and Thonemann (2012) in the newsvendor game or Montmarquette, Rulliere, Villeval, and Zeiliger (2004) for a merger experiment, and for one of physicians and students, BrosigKoch, Hennig-Schmidt, et al. (2016) .
12 Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004) showed that three or more firms typically create a competitive situation in oligopoly experiments. 13 Note that subjects were informed that the experiment consisted of two consecutive parts and received detailed instructions for the second part only after having finished the first part of the experiment.
the merger scenario, we also differentiate between a merger without synergies (Merger), one with cost synergies (Synergy), and one with team decisions (Merger Team; see Table 1 for a treatment overview). Each part consists of 15 sequential decision rounds. A market consists of three randomly matched subjects, who each have the role of head of their respective hospital. Subjects know that they are matched once at the beginning and remain in this group composition throughout the whole experiment.
| Decision situation
In each decision situation, subjects simultaneously choose the quality level q i that they want to provide to patients from the strategy set Q = {1, 2, 3, … , 13}. 14 When making their decisions, subjects have full information about each possible constellation of their own and their competitors 0 quality choices, and the resulting profits and patient benefits. This information is available in the form of a profit and patient benefit table being handed out with the instructions (see Appendix S1 for the respective profit and patient benefit tables). Moreover, a profit and benefit calculator is implemented in the computer programme.
To create a more realistic decision situation, which allows for altruism towards patients, we implemented a transfer of the monetary equivalent of quality choices similar to Eckel and Grossman (1996) Participants in the experiment knew that the higher the level of quality provided, the more money would go to a charity granting uninsured patients in Germany, who would otherwise not be treated or have access to health care.
After all hospitals have chosen their quality levels, individual market shares are determined. As patients are not students present in the lab, each hospital 0 s market share is simulated on the basis of patients 0 utility function for the respective quality choices within the market. By simulating patient choice rather than having other participants as patients in the laboratory, we create a decision scenario under complete information. The decision round is concluded with feedback for each subject about their own quality choice, profits, contribution to patient utility, and the according information for their rivals.
| Treatments
In our baseline Competition treatment, there is no change in the market setting between Part 1 and Part 2, and subjects receive the information that the experiment will continue as before.
As previously mentioned, in our main treatments with a merger (Merger and Synergy), an intervention occurs after the decision rounds of Part 1 and-depending on the treatment-the market situation changes in Part 2 (Table 1) . Albeit the market situation may change, the hospital structure remains; that is, no hospital is closed down because of the merger. In Part 2 of the Merger and Synergy treatments, two randomly chosen hospitals are exogenously merged. Then, one of the heads of a hospital is randomly determined to make uniform quality choices for both hospitals. The other head of the merged hospitals remains in the lab without an active role; however, it receives half of the profits generated by the merged entity. 16 The subject in charge of the third hospital continues to operate on his or her own. In this asymmetric 14 Note that we implemented a discrete choice set compared to the continuous theoretical framework in order to decrease complexity for individuals.
15 Eckel and Grossman (1996) show in a double blind scenario of a dictator game-thus independent of any experimenter demand effect-that when the money goes to a real charity, this substantially increases altruistic giving compared to a scenario with student recipients. 16 Note that compared to the theoretical model, we introduced a simple distribution rule similar to that of Huck et al. (2007) in the experimental design.
An interesting variation would be to introduce a bargaining stage on how to distribute joint profits. post-merger structure, the subjects associated with the merged entity will henceforth be referred to as (active and passive) insider and the independent competitor as outsider. The two treatments differ in their post-merger cost structure. Whereas in the Merger treatment there is no change in the cost structure, in the Synergy treatment, the insiders are able to realise cost synergies and operate with reduced marginal costs in Part 2.
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In our Merger Team treatment, a hospital consists of a board of three people instead of one person. This team of three has to make joint decisions on quality level. The implemented decision mechanism is a simple majority rule similar to Gillet, Schram, and Sonnemans (2011) : The three team members can suggest their preferred quality level, and in case two or all members select the same level, it is implemented as the hospital quality level for the respective round. In case of a tie, the process is repeated until a decision is reached. 18 The parameters are identical to the Merger treatment.
We control for whether altruism also plays a role irrespective of the competitive scenario by conducting a Monopoly treatment. Here, instead of being part of a competitive market, subjects have the role of the head of the only hospital in the market and make individual treatment decisions about the quality of care for the unit mass of patients. From an experimental perspective, this decision scenario is equivalent to a dictator game. Whereas in the competitive scenario more quality might result in higher profits and patient benefits due to a larger patient share, in the Monopoly treatment, higher quality always results in lower profits and higher patient benefits. Thus, there is a direct trade-off between profits and patient benefits, and the profit-maximising strategy is always to provide the lowest quality level. Consequently, any deviation from this strategy can be attributed to altruistic behaviour towards patients.
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To ensure that the market is fully covered, we have to adjust the basic valuation. Thus, treatments are not quantitatively comparable with each other. For a complete set of our parameter specifications per treatment, see Appendix S2.
| Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Essen Laboratory for Experimental Economics (elfe) at the University of DuisburgEssen, Germany, in 2015. In total, 353 participants, all being students from the University of Duisburg-Essen, were recruited via the recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) . Out of all participants, 164 were male and 189 female.
20 Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned seats in the laboratory. Then, they were given instructions for the first part of the corresponding treatment and were informed that the experiment consisted of two consecutive parts. Yet they received detailed instructions for the second part only after having finished the first part of the experiment. They were given time to read the instructions and to ask comprehension questions, which were answered in private. Prior to each part, they had to answer a set of control questions. The experiment did not start unless all subjects had answered the control questions correctly. At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to answer a short questionnaire with questions on demographics and questions related to their behaviour in the previous decisions. The experiment was computerised using the software zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) . On average, a session lasted 120 min. All monetary amounts were given in experimental currency Taler, the exchange rate being 1 Taler = 0.07€ in the Merger, Synergy, and Competition treatments; 1 Taler = 0.02€ in the Monopoly treatment; and 1 Taler = 0.21€ in the Merger Team treatment. 21 In the individual treatments, the average payoff per subject was 17.75€ and the average contribution to the patient was 8.14€, whereas the average payoff per subject in Merger Team was 18.10€ and the average contribution to the patients was 7.67€. In Monopoly, the average payoff was 20.36€ and the average contribution to the patient 7.82€. The monetary value of the cumulated contributions to the patient was transferred to "Ärzte der Welt e.V." To verify this transfer, a randomly chosen subject monitored the procedure after each session. This included checking that the correct amount was written on the transfer order to the university 0 s financial department and depositing the order in a sealed envelope in the nearest mailbox. This effort was compensated with an additional 5€. 17 We chose parameters such that in line with Hypothesis 3, all hospitals would set a higher quality than in a merger without synergies, insiders would set a higher quality than would outsiders, and a higher quality than that in the pre-merger Nash equilibrium.
18 Note that given our experimental design, the choice of how much quality to provide can be interpreted as continuous and preferences are monotonic in the sense that everybody has a threshold to which they agree to provide that quality and disagree for higher qualities.
19 Although our experimental design only allows controlling for altruism across treatments, a sequential design including the Monopoly treatment could serve to derive individual baseline levels of altruism.
20 Note that the sample includes 19 medical students as well as 130 business and economics students. 21 Exchange rates differ across treatments to guarantee the same individual payoff on average and hence the same incentives for subjects. Therefore, the exchange rate for Merger Team is three times larger than that for Merger, Synergy, and Competition. The exchange rate in Monopoly is 0.02€ due to rounding. The exchange rates apply to both the profits and the patient benefit.
| RESULTS

| Effect of market concentration on quality
| Pre-merger scenario
We begin by investigating quality choices in the pre-merger scenario Part 1. Figure 1a shows the predicted Nash equilibria (dashed lines) and the development of average market quality choices for each round in Part 1 and Part 2 and for the two treatment conditions Competition and Merger. See Table 2 for the respective mean quality choices. To account for possible first round and end-game effects, we henceforth exclude the first round in Part 1 and the last round in Part 2 in all treatments. 22 From Figure 1a , one can infer that in Part 1 of the two treatment conditions, which are characterised by the same oligopoly competition scenario, average quality choices are initially set below the predicted Nash equilibrium and then quickly converge towards it in both treatments. Average market qualities for Part 1 across Rounds 2-15 do not differ from the predicted Nash equilibrium of 10 for the Competition treatment and are weakly significantly above it for the Merger treatment (Wilcoxon signed rank test, Competition p = .1839, Merger p = .0636). 23 However, comparing the average market qualities between Competition and Merger for Rounds 2-15, we find no significant differences 22 An indication for a first round effect is that average quality choice in Round 1 significantly differs from the average quality choice across Rounds 2 to 15 in Part 1. Similarly, the last round in Part 2 significantly differs from the average quality choices of Rounds 16 to 29 in Part 2, which is an indication for a last round effect. For a more detailed discussion, see Appendix S3. 23 The latter might indicate altruistic behaviour. Yet the choice of the Nash equilibrium of 10 is quite high, leaving little room for meaningful interpretations compared to, for instance, Part 2 of the Merger treatment. For a more detailed discussion of altruism, see Section 4.2.1.
FIGURE 1 Average market quality levels for (a) Competition and Merger and (b) insiders and outsiders in Merger
(Mann-Whitney U test, p = .5727). 24 Thus, we have no selection effect for the different treatments. Furthermore, our results are robust for being a medical or nonmedical student as well as for gender (see Appendix S4). 
| Post-merger scenario
Next, we analyse the effect of a merger on the quality of care. Due to the merger, the Nash equilibrium quality choices for outsiders and insiders decrease, resulting in a reduction of the average predicted quality from 10 to 3.33 26 in the latter (see Table 2 ). To control for potential responses arising from round specific effects (e.g., experience or learning), we first compare the change in average quality levels to our baseline condition Competition, in which there is no change from Part 1 to Part 2 and thus no change in the predicted quality levels.
27 Figure 1a , however, illustrates that there is a drop in quality levels from Part 1 to Part 2 for both Merger and Competition. For Part 2, the dashed lines in Figure 1a again mark the respective average quality choices if subjects played the Nash equilibrium strategies. When comparing Rounds 2-15 to 16-29, we find a significant drop in quality levels regardless of an actual change in the market setting (Competition p = .0184, Merger p = .0001). One explanation for the drop in Competition is that a restart may trigger collusion.
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The end-game effect in this treatment towards the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium supports this argument.
To disentangle the effects of potential collusive behaviour and reduced market concentration in Part 2, we compare average quality levels in Merger to our baseline Competition treatment. Table 2 shows that Merger markets decrease quality to 7.32, whereas Competition markets only decrease quality to 8.84. The difference in quality reduction between treatments is statistically significant (p = .0136). This supports Hypothesis 1, that a merger reduces quality levels.
Furthermore, in the Merger treatment, the drop in average quality could differ for the insiders and the outsider as predicted by the individual Nash equilibrium qualities (see Hypothesis 1). Even if subjects did not play the Nash equilibrium qualities, given the unilateral increase of market power for insiders and qualities being strategic complements, the range of best responses is between quality level 1 and 5 for the insiders and between 6 and 11 for outsiders. 29 In order to disentangle the different post-merger roles, we investigate average quality choices of insiders and outsiders separately (see Table 3 ). 24 Note that henceforth, all nonparametric tests reported for within-subject comparisons are Wilcoxon signed rank tests and for across-subject comparisons are Mann-Whitney U tests. 25 Note that the general empirical literature finds that women tend to be less competitive (Antonovics, Arcidiacono, & Walsh, 2009; Gneezy, Niederle, & Rustichini, 2003; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007) . 26 As the two merged hospitals would set a quality of 2 and the standalone hospital a quality of 6 in the Nash equilibrium, the simple average quality provided by hospitals would be 3.33. Different to the pre-merger situation, the equilibrium choices are not symmetric anymore, so it should be noted that the average of 3.33 is a stronger aggregation of information than is the average of 10.
27 Note that to keep the procedure in line with the other treatments, there was a short break between Parts 1 and 2 where subjects in the Competition treatment were informed that the experiment would proceed as before.
28 A way to test for whether learning or the break itself affected quality provision behaviour in Part 2 of the Competition treatment would have been to implement a treatment with competition in both parts, but without a break. 29 For the post-merger profit tables, see Appendix S1. To ensure that there are no selection effects of subjects into the respective roles, we first compare the quality choices in Part 1 of subjects who will become insiders and those who will become outsiders in Part 2 for the Merger treatment (see Figure 1b) . We find no significant differences (p = .7609). In Part 2 of the Merger treatment, both insiders and outsiders significantly reduce the average quality choices after the consolidation (insiders p = .0002, outsiders p = .0006). Our previous result, that the quality decrease is significantly larger in Merger compared to Competition, also holds if we separate by merger insiders and outsiders, and compare their post-merger quality choices to the market average in the Competition treatment (insiders p = .0064, outsiders p = .0867). This further supports Hypothesis 1.
Moreover, to get a sense of role-related behaviour in the Merger treatment, we take the difference of average quality levels between Part 2 and Part 1 for insiders and compare it to the difference of outsiders. In particular, although the Nash equilibrium quality for insiders decreases from 10 to 2, it only decreases to 6 for the outsider (see Table 3 and Figure 1b ). In line with the theoretical prediction of Hypothesis 1, we find that the reduction in quality levels is significantly higher for the insiders than for the outsiders, that is, −3.70 versus −2.55 (p = .0184). Thus, as predicted by Hypothesis 1, insiders reduce their quality levels more than outsiders do.
However, in contrast to the theoretical predictions, many insiders refrain from reducing quality to the predicted levels of 2 for the insiders and 6 for the outsiders. In fact, merger insiders set significantly higher qualities than predicted by the Nash equilibrium (p = .0000), that is, on average 6.89. Outsiders also set significantly higher quality levels than predicted (p = .0093), that is, on average 8.17. Moreover, we find that the upward deviation of the quality choice from the predicted Nash equilibrium choice is significantly more pronounced for the merger insiders compared to the merger outsiders (p = .0358).
Result 1 (corresponding to Hypothesis 1): In an asymmetric post-merger scenario where two out of three hospitals join their profit-maximising efforts: (a) All three hospitals significantly lower their quality compared to the pre-merger scenario. (b) Insiders decrease quality choices significantly more than outsiders do. (c) However, both insiders and outsiders set significantly higher qualities than the predicted Nash equilibrium choices. This upward deviation is significantly higher for the merger insiders.
| Factors influencing post-merger quality
| Altruism
In the previous section, we showed that in the Merger treatment, quality levels significantly decreased from Part 1 to Part 2 and that insiders tend to decrease quality more than outsiders do. However, both the insiders 0 and outsiders 0 average quality choices are well above the predicted Nash equilibrium choices. These deviations translate into lower profits for the subjects and higher patient utility. Subjects had complete information about the potential outcomes prior to their quality decisions, and thus, they could potentially play strategically best responses. Although the average post-merger choices for the outsider are on average still within the range of strategically reasonable quality levels (8.17, with the range of best response strategies being between 6 and 11), this is not the case for the insider. For a profit-maximising insider, only quality levels between 1 and 5 can be best response strategies, whereas 6 is a weakly dominated strategy and opting for any quality level higher than 6 is a strictly dominated strategy. Yet we find that the average quality for insiders is 6.89. Furthermore, 61.8% of qualities chosen by insiders are in the space of dominated strategies. This can also be interpreted as altruistic behaviour. 30 On the individual market level out of 23 30 Out of the 322 quality levels chosen by insiders between Rounds 16 and 29, 199 were quality level 6 or higher and 123 lower. For outsiders, 93 choices were dominated high-quality choices of 12 or 13, and 229 quality choices were lower. See Appendix S1 "profit table for merged hospitals" to examine the dominated strategies. markets, 10 play completely altruistically in the sense that the insider only plays dominated strategies of quality level 6 and higher. In three other markets, the majority of quality levels set by the insider are in the altruistic space. The remaining 10 markets have insiders that choose at least 50% quality levels within the strategically reasonable space.
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This indicates that one driving factor behind the lack of strategic behaviour and optimisation in terms of profit maximisation could be that subjects are altruistic or patient-oriented in the sense that they consider patient utility in their own objective function. To investigate whether altruistic behaviour plays a role further, we focus on the monetary consequences of the deviations from the profit-maximising quality. In particular, we measure the difference between realised profits and Nash equilibrium profits. This is a measure for the willingness of subjects to increase patient benefits at their own costs. Figure 2 shows the average market profits of Parts 1 and 2 of the experiment in the Merger treatment for insiders and outsiders, respectively. Average profits in the pre-merger scenario are below the Nash equilibrium prediction for both insiders and outsiders (see Table 3 ). We find that average profits are significantly lower than are the Nash equilibrium predictions for insiders (p = .0192) and outsiders (p = .0244). This indicates that even in the symmetric competition case, participants behave in a way that is more patient-oriented than expected by the Nash equilibrium. Although post-merger profit predictions increase compared to the pre-merger predictions, we find that both insiders 0 and outsiders 0 average profits are significantly below the Nash equilibrium prediction (insiders p = .0021, outsiders p = .0000).
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Result 2 (corresponding to Hypotheses 2 and 4): Pre-merger average profits are significantly lower than are the Nash equilibrium levels. In the post-merger scenario, both insiders 0 and outsiders 0 average profits are significantly below the Nash equilibrium prediction.
As the outcome in the oligopoly treatments relies on quality choices of more than a single hospital and quality setting has a strategic dimension, we investigate whether altruism also plays a role irrespective of competition or mergerinduced effects. To control for this strategic effect, we conducted a Monopoly treatment in which subjects have perfect control over the allocation of money between them and the patient. Similar to the other treatment conditions, yet more extreme, the heads of hospitals face a trade-off between pure profit-maximising quality of 1 and patient optimal quality of 13 (see Hypothesis 4). Hence, any upward deviation from the profit-maximising quality can be referred to as altruistic behaviour. In a way, this is equivalent to playing dominated strategies in the post-merger case. In Figure S6 in Appendix S6 Monopoly, we see that the majority of subjects in the monopoly condition consider patient benefits to at least some 31 Because the parameterisation markets in the first part are predominantly in line with the Nash predictions, we restrict this analysis for the postmerger scenario. For an overview of individual markets, see Appendix S5. 32 When using patient benefit as variable to measure altruistic behaviour, we find the same result. In the pre-merger scenario, the average contribution to patient utility is significantly higher than that in the predicted Nash equilibrium situation for insiders (p = .0885) and the outsider (p = .0553). In the post-merger scenario, it is also significantly higher for both insiders (p = .0000) and outsider (p = .0777). 33 This result is in line with previous studies where participants in the role of physicians show patient-oriented behaviour towards real patients outside the laboratory (Brosig-Koch, Hehenkamp, et al., 2016; Brosig-Koch, HennigSchmidt, et al., 2016; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017; Godager & Wiesen, 2013; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011) .
| Cost synergies
Another factor that might drive the effect of mergers is cost synergies. Although we found that in line with the theoretical predictions, a merger decreases quality, albeit less than expected, cost synergies could potentially offset this reduction and even lead to an increase in quality (see Hypothesis 3). To systematically investigate the effects of cost synergies, we compare the results of the Merger treatment with those of the Synergy one. To ensure that there are no selection effects of subjects into one of the three treatments Competition, Merger, and Synergy, we compare average quality choices in Part 1 across treatments for Rounds 2-15 and find no significant differences (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = .6348).
For the Synergy treatment, we find that that post-merger quality choices are significantly higher on average compared to that of the Merger treatment (p = .0148). 34 This result still holds if we separate by roles as both insiders and outsiders set significantly higher quality levels in Synergy whereas the absolute difference is larger for the former (insiders p = .0100, outsiders p = .0926). Thus, in line with Hypothesis 3, we find that sufficient cost synergies can to some degree offset the negative effects of reduced market concentration. However, both insiders and outsiders provide a significantly lower average quality, that is, for the 9.48 insiders and 9.88 for the outsiders, than predicted by the Nash equilibrium, that is, 12 and 11, respectively (p = .0002, outsiders p = .0555; see Table 4 ). This might be the consequence of the parameterisation Nash equilibrium qualities that are quite high and at the upper end of the strategy space, that is, the high Nash equilibria leave little room for upward deviations. Moreover, we find that quality levels do not significantly differ for insiders and outsiders (p = .5295). In particular, the reduction in quality between Parts 1 and 2, that is, −1.07 vs. −0.59, does not significantly differ (p = .0184). This might be a result of our parameterisation in the sense that the ex post Synergy Nash equilibrium quality levels are 11 and 12 and thus quite close to each other. In terms of profits, insiders are able to realise higher profits due to their advantageous cost structure (10.16 Taler per round, no significant difference to the Nash equilibrium prediction of 10, p = .9317) whereas outsiders suffer from the more efficient competitor (7.61 Taler per round, significantly different to the Nash equilibrium prediction of 6.72, p = .0633). We find that insiders 0 profits are significantly higher compared to the outsiders 0 in Synergy (p = .0000) and higher compared to the insiders 0 in the Merger treatment condition (p = .0705). In contrast, profits for outsiders are significantly lower in the Synergy treatment conditions compared to that in the Merger (p = .0023). All these results are supported by Hypothesis 3.
Result 3 (corresponding to Hypothesis 3): In an asymmetric post-merger scenario where two of three hospitals join their profit-maximising efforts and realise cost synergies, all three hospitals provide significantly higher quality than in the case without cost synergies.
| Team decisions
Concerning altruistic behaviour, the way decisions are made, that is, by an individual or in a team, might affect quality. This especially applies to hospitals, as decisions are often made within teams (Barros & Olivella, 2011) . Studies 33 In order to investigate whether altruistic behaviour is stable across both parts in case market conditions do not change, we investigate the correlation between quality choices as well as the correlation between the deviations to the maximum profits in Parts 1 and 2 in the Monopoly treatment. We find a very high correlation (.98) in quality levels as well as in the deviations to maximum profits (.98) between both parts. 34 Note that when comparing average quality levels of Synergy and Competition, we also find no significant differences (p = .3025). investigating team decisions show that although teams decide more selfishly than do individuals in ultimatum, trust and dictator games (Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998; Kugler, Bornstein, Kocher, & Sutter, 2007; Luhan, Kocher, & Sutter, 2009 ) evidence on team decisions in repeated games are mixed (Bornstein, Kugler, Budescu, & Selten, 2008; Brosig-Koch, Heinrich, & Helbach, 2014; Müller & Tan, 2013; Raab & Schipper, 2009 ).
To check whether altruistic behaviour differs in a team decision scenario, we conducted a Merger Team treatment, in which one market consists of three hospitals with three decision makers each. In total, we have 13 market observations for Merger Team treatment. Comparing the average quality levels of these team markets with the 23 individual markets of the Merger treatment yields significant differences in neither Part 1 nor Part 2 (Part 1, p = .3312; Part 2, p = .6806). See Figure 3 for an illustration.
As an indicator for altruistic behaviour, we considered the difference to the Nash equilibrium profits. In both treatments, the pre-merger Nash equilibrium profits are 8 Taler for each hospital. In the experiment, the markets in the individual Merger treatments realised average profits of 7.43 Taler, whereas in the Merger Team treatment, markets were slightly less profitable with 7.16 Taler on average. Both are significantly different from the predicted Nash equilibrium profits (Merger p = .0074, Merger Team p = .0037). This shows that pre-merger teams also show altruistic behaviour. Like for the average qualities, the differences in profits are not significantly different between the Merger and Merger Team treatments (p = .4197).
For the post-merger scenario, we again separate by the roles. We find that outsiders realise post-merger profits of 9.91 in the Merger and 10.54 in the Merger Team treatment and lie significantly below the predicted 14.22 Nash equilibrium profit (Merger p = .000, Merger Team p = .0019). The insiders have profits of 9.39 and of 9.65 in individual and team treatments, respectively. These profits also lie significantly below the predicted level of 11.11 for Merger and Merger Team (Merger p = .0021, Merger Team p = .0277). Thus, we find no difference between teams and individuals. This is in contrast to the existing literature in which teams rather try to get the best deal for their ingroup, play more competitively, defect more, and trust less (see Charness & Sutter, 2012 , for a survey). A possible explanation for the fact that we do not find differences between Merger and Merger Team could stem from social image concerns (see Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006) . In particular, the effect to behave more selfishly due to deciding in teams might be offset by social image concerns in the sense that in a team, quality decisions become more visible and subjects may want to uphold a certain social image of being a good healthcare provider.
Result 4: We find no significant difference in average quality levels and profits between individual and team decisions.
| CONCLUSION
In this study, we investigate the effect of a hospital merger in a competitive market on the quality of care in a controlled laboratory experiment. In particular, we analyse the drivers of potential effects such as market concentration, altruistic behaviour, merger-induced efficiency gains due to cost synergies, and the form of the decision process. We base our experimental design on a standard Salop model and adjust it to the specificities of hospital markets. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that the post-merger average quality is significantly lower than the average pre-merger quality is. However, especially for merger insiders but also for outsiders, average quality choices are significantly higher than predicted for pure profit-maximising hospitals. The upward deviation is potentially driven by semi-altruistic behaviour towards patients as in Godager and Wiesen (2013) , Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011 ), Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, et al. (2016 , Brosig-Koch, Hehenkamp, et al. (2016), and Brosig-Koch et al., (2017) . In particular, heads of hospitals are willing to give up part of their own profit to increase patient utility, resulting in the negative effects of mergers due to increased market concentration being less severe than in markets with profit-maximising agents only. This finding underlines the importance of considering the healthcare providers 0 respective degrees of altruism in the hospital market when analysing the effects of a merger on the quality of care. Although in our experimental design patients always accept the lowest quality level, future work could further examine how quality provision varies when patients can make effective choices about whether to receive treatment or not. Our results thus confirm the assumptions about semi-altruistic hospitals made by Brekke et al. (2011) and Brekke et al. (2016) in their theoretical frameworks. For empirical and policy analyses, they propose to acknowledge for differences in altruistic behaviour. Evidence for for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals, for instance, indicates that the latter are more altruistic and provide better quality (Eggleston, Shen, Lau, Schmid, & Chan, 2008; Schlesinger, Dowart, Hoover, & Epstain, 1997; Sloan, 2000) . Our experimental design also relates to the recent developments in hospital markets that show a tendency for decreasing numbers of hospital owners, and particularly, situations where hospital chains and independent hospitals serve the same market. For such situations, our results suggest that merger-induced market power asymmetries lead to smaller quality provision discrepancies between the merged hospitals and the standalone hospital than predicted for pure profit-maximising hospitals.
Our results are robust for the decision making process, that is, whether individuals as heads of hospitals or teams decide on the quality of care. Furthermore, we find that although quality levels after a merger are higher than are predicted, sufficient cost synergies of the merged hospitals yield a significant increase in average quality choices compared to the merger scenario without cost synergies. This is in line with our theoretical predictions and stresses the importance of cost synergies for the overall success of a merger. However, cost synergies are exogenous in our experimental design. Future research should investigate individual behaviour more as well as endogenous decisions to invest in cost containment.
